Three Criminal Impacts of Revoking Temporary Protected Status “TPS” for Venezuelans in the U.S.

By InSightCrime  |  February 14, 2025
This article by Venezuela Investigation Unit originally appeared on Insight Crime and is being published by ElSalvadorINFO.net under a Creative Commons icense.

The Trump administration officially revoked Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for approximately 350,000 Venezuelans on February 3. This decision exposes them to deportation, and puts the most vulnerable at risk of falling prey to organized crime.

TPS was established by the US Congress in 1990 to provide deportation relief and work permits to nationals of countries affected by conflict, disasters, or other extraordinary conditions. Venezuela was granted TPS in 2021 due to its political and economic crisis, benefiting around 600,000 Venezuelans.

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The revocation will not take effect until April 7, giving affected individuals several weeks to voluntarily leave the country or seek other forms of immigration relief, such as asylum. Meanwhile, Venezuelans who obtained TPS in 2021 will continue to benefit from it until September 2025, thanks to an 18-month extension granted in March 2024.

What are the criminal implications of this decision?

SEE ALSO: Latin America: Who wins and who loses after Trump’s victory?

1. Tren de Aragua as a Vehicle for Criminalizing Migrants

The revocation of TPS for Venezuelans comes as the Trump administration pushes a narrative portraying the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua as a major security threat to the United States, despite a lack of concrete evidence confirming its presence or reach within the country.

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During Joe Biden’s presidency, reports surfaced alleging Tren de Aragua was active in at least 10 states. However, authorities provided little detail on how they identified suspected members.

As his campaign drew to a close, Donald Trump frequently referred to Tren de Aragua, a strategy reminiscent of his first term when the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13)—a gang formed by Salvadoran migrants in Los Angeles in the 1980s—became a central focus of his rhetoric.

Upon returning to office, Trump ordered his administration to explore classifying the Venezuelan gang as a “terrorist organization” and is now considering invoking the 1798 Alien Enemies Act.

This law would allow the government to deport migrants allegedly linked to gangs without judicial hearings or due process.

The last time similar measures were enacted was during World War II, when the US government used them to justify the internment of individuals of Japanese, German, and Italian descent.

Such actions could lead to the mass deportation of Venezuelans, via being unjustly linked to the Tren de Aragua for political reasons rather than based on verifiable evidence.

In fact, recent reports indicate that some Venezuelans have been detained and transferred to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, solely for having tattoos—even though Tren de Aragua members do not typically use specific tattoos as part of their initiation process.

SEE ALSO: What Is Know About Tren de Aragua’s Growing Presence in the United States?

2. Risk of Criminal Recruitment

Leveraging Tren de Aragua as a justification for deportations is reminiscent of what happened with MS13 in the 1990s. At that time, mass deportations from the United States to Central America contributed to the gang’s expansion throughout the Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

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MS13 gained strength as many deported individuals found themselves in vulnerable situations, making them easy targets for gang recruitment. And many were landing in countries just emerging from civil conflicts, such as Guatemala and El Salvador, and home to social and economic conditions that proved to be petri dishes for the gangs.

A similar phenomenon could unfold in Venezuela, where social, political, and economic crises persist. The conditions that forced many Venezuelans to migrate remain unchanged, increasing the likelihood that some deportees may turn to criminal networks or become victims of organized crime.

“I don’t think there’s enough evidence to say that [deported individuals] will be recruited by criminal gangs, but logic tells us that if they return to a context where humanitarian conditions have not improved and there are no job opportunities, there are incentives to engage in informal or even illicit economies,” Laura Cristina Dib, director of the Venezuela program at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), told InSight Crime.

SEE ALSO: The Impact of the Colombia-Venezuela Border Reopening on Smuggling Dynamics

3. Smuggling Networks Could Reap the Benefits

The beginning of deportations under the Trump administration’s agreement with President Nicolás Maduro means that many Venezuelans may attempt to flee again after being sent back.

“The complex humanitarian emergency [in Venezuela] persists. An authoritarian government remains in power, which could criminalize those who immigrated to the United States or engaged in any form of activism there.

That’s why it’s likely that deportees will seek to migrate again, using any routes they can find,” Dib said.

Deported individuals with family in the United States may attempt to return through irregular channels, while others could seek refuge in different South American countries.

Additionally, surveys suggest that many Venezuelans plan to leave the country following Maduro’s inauguration.

Both scenarios would benefit migrant smuggling networks and human traffickers, who have already profited from the massive Venezuelan exodus in recent years.

This article by Venezuela Investigation Unit originally appeared on Insight Crime and is being published by ElSalvadorINFO.net under a Creative Commons icense.